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THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:
THE REALITY BEHIND THE MYTH
Gerald F. Moran*
INVENTING AMERICA:
JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE. By Garry Wills. Garden City, New York: Double-

day & Company, Inc. 1978. Pp. xxvi, 398. $10.00.
The Declaration of Independence exerts a considerable, if
often imperceptible, influence over our civil and political culture,
as does the history that brought it to life. Political actions are
often undertaken in defense of its governing principles, it frequently sets the tone of civic oratory and rhetoric, and it often
guides this country's perceptions of itself. The Declaration's
power resides in its evocative preamble and in the drama of
founding fathers bringing forth a unique republican nation dedicated to certain laudable values and universal ideals. All the
ceremony and celebration of a Fourth of July testify to the centrality of this drama in our national life.
But the Declaration of Independence, as we know and use it
today, is largely symbolic, for it conveys meanings to us beyond
those intended in 1776, and it also evokes ideals and images that
few eighteenth-century men and women employed. Different generations tended to read their own special history and philosophy
into it, so that layer upon layer of myth now encase it. We urgently need studies devoted to resurrecting the meaning of the
Declaration in light of its precise historical context, otherwise we
will continue to misapprehend the myths of our political culture,
misunderstand the disjunction between national symbol and national history, and misread the history that produced such important documents as the American Constitution.
Inventing America is one such study. Written by a well. known journalist, adjunct professor of humanities at Johns Hopkins University, and author of several well-known books, including Nixon Agonistes and Bare Ruined Choirs, it sets out to expose
the myth and the reality behind the Declaration and its history.
Consider, for example, the pervasive belief that Congress accepted and signed the Declaration on July 4, 1776, thus initiating
the American Revolution. Actually, the Pontinental Congress for* Associate Professor of History, University of Michigan-Dearborn. A.B. 1966,
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806

Jan.-Mar. 1979]

Declaration of Independence

807

mally announced its separation from England on July 2, when it
approved Richard Henry Lee's resolution for independence, and
then it went about the more pressing business of negotiating a
treaty with France, devising articles of unification, and conducting a war. Delegates to Congress began signing a formal Declaration on August 2, in commemoration and explanation of actions
already undertaken, and quickly forgot about it. Not until many
years later, really after the War of 1812, did Americans turn to
the Declaration and a mythical July Fourth signing as somehow
bringing forth a new republican nation.
When they did, they struck upon the preamble and its principles, paying little heed to the great bulk of the document, the list
of grievances against Gei:,rge ill. The grievances were tied to a
forgotten history, the preamble was not. It contained ideals which
could be applied in different ways to different historical circumstances, and during the nineteenth century it began to take on a
life of its own, shaping events and being shaped by them. In
November 1863, Abraham Lincoln produced one of many enduring interpretations of the preamble and its history. "Four score
and seven years ago," he proclaimed at Gettysburg, "our fathers
brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created
equal." The war the North was engaged in would test "whether
that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long
endure." Men had died in battle so that "that nation might live."
We should "highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in
vain-that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of
freedom-and that government of the people, by the people, for
the people, shall not perish from the earth."
Here, as elsewhere, according to Garry Wills, history became
myth. Lincoln had proposed that in 1776 men who were united
in purpose had created a union of lasting value and significance.
In fact, the delegates at Philadelphia, who first convened as a.
Congress in September 1774, were men with little sense of nation
but with strong provincial loyalties, men of "competing interests
and cultures" who were able nevertheless to agree on a tactic to
seek redress of grievances committed by England. They decided
to use the petition (and not the courts, which were limited to
breeches of statute or positive law) to addres!jl the British government on its violations against "fundamental law," and once they
defined what that law was, they struggled to create a joint list of
legitimate complaints out of thirteen separate and often antagonistic ones. Most of the delegates agreed on principles. "The differ-
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ences arose over application of 'fundamental law' to particular
acts, listed one by one, as part of a system at odds with the whole
ethos of the British constitution" (p. 64). When England ignored
the petitions of 1774 and 1775, Congress felt compelled to undertake a revolution, (by its view, a reasoned defense of the colonists'
rights as Englishmen) and to declare that legal pleas had failed
to thwart the perverse acts of a tyrannical monarch. Independence was the logical result of the failure of the petition, while
the Declaration itself, as passed by Congress, was the expression
of a consensus on certain constitutional grievances which together
justified revolution.
This Declaration, Wills argues, is political, while our Declaration is symbolic, and Thomas Jefferson's Declaration, which
Congress altered severely, is philosophical. The differences between each of these three versions "have been both underrated
and misstated" (p. ix). What of Jefferson's text? This question,
which is crucial to an understanding of the differences, is the
central concern of Inventing America. What did Jefferson mean
by what he said? "To understand any text remote from us in
time, we must reassemble a world around that text. The preconceptions of the original audience, its tastes, its range of reference,
must be recovered, so far as that is possible. We must forget what
was learned, or what occurred, in the interval between our time
and the text's. We must resurrect beliefs now discarded" (p. 269).
This is Wills's strategy. To understand truly Jefferson's draft of
the Declaration, the one he wrote at the behest of a congressional
committe.e in June 1776, it is necessary to reconstruct his lost
intellectual world and the philosophy to which he adhered.
Wills consciously adopts a Jeffersonian style in his pursuit of
precision and clarity. The Virginia planter, like the preamble he
wrote, is often considered idealistic and visionary. But, as Wills
contends, he was an empiricist, not an idealist. Mathematics and
statistics fascinated him, and he sought, among other things, a
political science of numbers to measure public happiness. He
avoided the metaphysical for the observable, disliked theory and
generalization, and felt that ideas should be grounded upon reality. As it changed, so should the ideas it aroused. And as each
generation underwent new experiences, it would discover new
laws.
But Jefferson, if guided by experience, was also attached
primarily to sentiment and the emotional in man. He considered
the Head inferior to the Heart. The Head could only reflect passively upon means to ends, upon technique and strategy, while
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the Heart, the domain of duty, morality, and virtue, was "a principle of action," the higher faculty that determined ends and
motives. Wills, unlike many other scholars, contends that Jefferson actually made the Heart win out over the Head in his famous
letter of 1786 to Maria Cosway. Jefferson, the scientist and mathematician, was somehow a devotee of the sentimental in man; he,
like Voltaire, advocated a religion of the Heart.
Take, for example, one of the several passages Congress excised from his Declaration, a passage of over three-hundred
words. Intended as the climax to his text, it bristled with emotion
as Jefferson went beyond ministry, Parliament, and King to attack the "British brethren" for allowing the English government
to exercise a corrupt and damaging rule over America. By closing
ears to just complaints, by failing to remove British rulers, "the
disturbers of our harmony," from power, and by permitting
George ill to invade the colonies with mercenaries, they had
"given the last stab to agonizing affection," and thus, he proclaimed, "manly spirit bids us to renounce for ever these unfeeling brethren." Americans must now "endeavor to forget our former love for them," he continued, "and to hold them as we hold
the rest of mankind enemies in war, in peace friends. We might
have been a free and a great people together; but a communication of grandeur & of freedom it seems is below their dignity. Be
it so, since they will have it. The road to happiness & to glory is
open to us too. We will tread it apart from them, and acquiesce
in the necessity which denounces our eternal separation" (p. 378).
When it eliminated these passages, and also those on slavery,
Congress altered profoundly the real meaning of Jefferson's Declaration, leaving "one people" and "political bands" as isolated
traces of its original, overarching design. Congress saw the Declaration as "a propaganda 9verture, addressed primarily to France,
which the treaty was meant to follow" (p. 333), but Jefferson had
had something different in mind. Although he had managed to
voice the common sentiment on grievances, he had let slip, when
unhampered by practical and political considerations, some uncommon personal observations, which Congress later scratched.
Where most Americans felt that the King was the last link
between them and England, and independence was a matter of
severing ties with him, Jefferson believed otherwise. His
"declaration of independence," Wills indicates, "is a renunciation of unfeeling brethren. His whole document was shaped to
make that clear" (p. 319). His "political bands" of .empire did not
rest upon submission, sovereignty, or the power of rulers over
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ruled, but rather upon brotherhood, respect, and trust, upon
affections and sentiments that made any people "one." A society
or political community could not exist without mutual benevolence, nor could compacts promote sociability where none prevailed. Independence signalled the creation of a new community
of people who were still capable of acting and feeling in consort.
Jefferson allowed his Heart to rule his Head when forced to
explain English actions and their possible consequences for
Americans. He and other colonists not only employed legal principles in defense of their rights as Englishmen, but also used such
terms as "corruption," "power," "conspiracy," "virtue," and
"liberty" in political discourse which was often animated and
bombastic. These notions, according to recent studies, were part
and parcel of a republican world view, a Revolutionary ideology
that was shaped by the colonists' highly selective reading and by
their special situation-their remoteness from the locus of sovereignty, for example. They tended to overreact to any unconstitutional act, however slight, because they believed that corruption
could easily permeate a system and lead officials to conspire for
power at the expense of public liberty. During the imperial crisis,
and when the old order was beginning to dissolve, many Americans sought to promote virtue, patriotism, or the common good
in defense of liberty against corrupt, power-hungry Englishmen.
This republican ideology had very little to do with John
Locke's Two Treatises of Government, as scholars have recently
shown. Nor did the Two Treatises inform Jefferson's philosophy
at the time he wrote the Declaration of Independence, as Carl
Becker once maintained. Jefferson was not a Lockean individualist who believed in a social compact based on property rights.
Moreover, Wills says, he "was opposed to the individualist vision
of private enterprise" (p. 366). His communitarian value system
did not square with the nineteenth century's reading of John
Locke.
Rather, he was devoted to the Scottish Enlightenment and
its moral-sense philosophy. Such men as David Hume, Thomas
Reid, William Small (his tutor at William and Mary), and Francis Hutcheson (whose writings he especially valued), guided him
when he wrote phrases like "the pursuit of happiness" and "all
men are created equal," phrases that today seem abstract and
visionary. When Jefferson substituted "pursuit of happiness" for
Locke's "property" in the pantheon of inalienable rights, he intended to say that unless men were allowed to follow their instincts for the natural good, the body politic would flounder. Be-
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cause moral sense enabled men to take pleasure in benevolent
acts and to perceive mutual benevolence as the highest good, they
were capable of transcending the self and working for the wellbeing of all people. The free pursuit of public happiness was, for
Jefferson, the backbone of any free society, state, or government.
Like "pursuit of happiness," "all men are created equal" has
confounded historians who have failed to read the Declaration in
light of moral-sense philosophy. Jefferson felt that all men were
equal, not necessarily before God or the law, or in the free marketplace, but because they were endowed with the same Heart. Inequalities in sentiment existed only because of inadequate education and nurture. At the basis of his whole political creed was "the
belief that all men possess an equal and automatically functioning moral sense, to serve as the ground for rights and self-rule"
{p. 285).

According to Wills, Scottish philosophy also held sway over
Jefferson's thinking on slavery. Blacks, he believed, were born
with the same instincts and sentiments, the same Heart, as
whites, but slavery crippled their moral-sense faculties. He suggested that all slaves born after a certain date be educated apart
from their parents, and then, when they became adults, be deported at Virginia's expense to another territory, where they
could pursue their instincts and live in freedom· and happiness.
Individual manumission, on the other hand, would lead only to
race war and genocide, for how could the oppressed be expected
to unite peacefully with the oppressor? Society, like government,
functioned best when people had similar .interests and shared a
common ethos; without mutual benevolence, people would divide
into parties and internal warfare would ensue. For the same reasons he opposed the continued migration of whites into Virginia,
American ties to a decadent Europe, and the continued union of
colonists with their unfeeling brethren, he objected to individual
emancipation as inimical to social homogeneity, fraternity, and
peace.
Of course, a plantation culture was also at stake here. Did
paternalism and economic self-interest enter into Jefferson's
thinking on slavery? If so, how? Wills does not say. He maintains that Jefferson was thoroughly consistent in his philosophy
and in his views on such matters as slavery, but he fails to demonstrate that plantation exigencies did not interfere with his imported ideas. Because Wills relies heavily upon textual parallels
and thematic echoes to expose an ideational network, he risks
overlooking possible ambiguities and contradictions resulting
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from tensions between ideals and experience. With all his understanding of Scottish philosophy, he would have done well to have
shown us where Jefferson's ethos either resisted or absorbed the
culture of the plantation and the interests of the slaveholder.
Wills also argues that Jefferson was equally consistent in
political principle and that neither he nor many other men of
his generation, shifted strategy from 1776 to 1787, when the Constitution was formulated. No contradictions, Wills says, existed
between the convention of 1787 and Revolutionary ideals, for the
same men supported both movements and adhered to the same
ideas, including a theory of social counterpoise which flowed into
federalism. Much of this is true. But what should we make of the
presidency, among other constitutional innovations? The men
who created a powerful government in 1787, one that rode roughshod over the states, had the problems of post-war America in
mind, not those of the Revolution. During the 1780s Americans
turned inward to resolve domestic issues, and old words tended
to acquire new meanings. Where "power" had once expressed
concern for executive tyranny, it now conveyed anxieties about
legislative oppression. Where liberty had been considered in public terms, it now was interpreted more privately by some people
who sought to protect property and creditors' rights and to facilitate commerce. Where "virtue" had once been used to gauge the
extent of English corruption, it now conveyed anxieties about
American morality and the country's ability to survive as a republic, so brittle had republics proved to be in the past. The
Constitution combined both the old and the new, both the locale
and the nation, for example.
I doubt whether the colonists could have achieved any common intellectual front within Wills's America of disparate communities and cultures, where each province maintained closer
ties with England than with one another and where a bewildering
variety of regions and social groupings existed. Certainly no sense
of nation could have prevailed before 1776. Or could it have?
More and more after the mid-eighteenth-century colonial elites
travelled to England and there rubbed shoulders with other colonists who were likewise pursuing an education, promoting political causes, and arranging business alliances. Newspapers in
America also proliferated after the 1740s, thus promoting communication, and contacts among merchants increased as trade
escalated. The imperial crisis brought together many lawyers,
merchants, and planters in intercolonial assemblies, where they
worked out a united resistance to England and created a common
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wartime strategy. These men developed a precocious sense of
nation even before 1776, and after then they became increasingly
committed to the idea of a central government. At the same time,
provincial and local loyalties prevailed among many groups of
people, some of whom were to be found in the back country. Their
particularistic attitudes cropped up in resistance to the Constitution.
Despite some of its oversights, Inventing America is an important and exciting work, one which should be read for what it
says about the history behind our national niyths. Wills exposes
a significant source of Revolutionary ideas. He shows the importance of placing texts in their historical context and of approaching such terms as democracy, liberty, equality, and rights only
with reference to their original meaning and shifting cultural and
historical milieu. He enters a necessary warning against projecting the nineteenth-century mystique of the self-made man into
earlier eras, especially the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
He, like other recent historians, demonstrates that historical precedents do exist for considering American society and politics in
terms of the family and the community, not the individual. Too
few of us today have been willing to concede that we live in a
pluralistic society of subcommunities and subcultures, not an
unwieldy composite of isolated, competing individuals. Inventing
America should excite further attempts to uncover the real meaning of 1776.

